Executive Summary

India faces a strategic contradiction. Policies that helped secure domestic food production — public procurement, minimum support prices (MSP), irrigation expansion and subsidised agricultural electricity — have also reinforced production patterns that, in some north-western regions, depend on groundwater extraction exceeding assessed annual replenishment.

The resulting depletion threatens the long-term productive base that food-security policy is intended to protect.

The scale of the problem is geographically uneven. India’s 2024 national groundwater assessment estimated extraction at 60.47% of the annual extractable resource. The corresponding figures for Punjab and Haryana were 156.87% and 135.96%, respectively. These are administrative assessment ratios, not direct measurements of every aquifer, but they demonstrate the severity of pressure in parts of north-western India.

The central policy question is therefore not simply how to reduce agricultural water consumption.

It is:

How can India restore groundwater sustainability without undermining domestic food production, farmer incomes or the institutional arrangements that have contributed to national food security?

This paper develops an integrated programme addressing that question. It combines water-supply substitution, irrigation modernisation, wastewater reuse, aquifer-level governance, economic incentives and farmer protection within a single implementation framework.

The proposal does not recommend blanket restrictions on rice or wheat cultivation, a general withdrawal of MSP or procurement guarantees, or a sudden increase in farmers’ electricity bills.

Instead, it proposes a sequenced transition:

  1. Protect domestic food production and farmer incomes.
  2. Improve and diversify the water-supply system.
  3. Reduce avoidable groundwater demand through appropriate technologies.
  4. Establish transparent aquifer-level water accounting and local governance.
  5. Align public incentives with independently verified outcomes.
  6. Consider targeted crop-pattern adjustment only as a safeguarded last resort.

A multi-season pilot in selected aquifer blocks in Punjab and Haryana would test the combined approach before wider implementation.

The principal contribution is an implementation architecture connecting existing and additional measures to a common objective: measurable groundwater recovery without compromising food security.

1. The Problem: Protecting the Productive Base

Groundwater depletion in north-western India should not be understood as a problem caused simply by farmers using too much water.

It is the result of an interconnected system involving:

  • agricultural production and crop economics;
  • public procurement and price assurance;
  • electricity subsidies and pumping costs;
  • canal infrastructure and surface-water availability;
  • groundwater access and extraction;
  • population and food demand;
  • rainfall, recharge and regional hydrology.

Each element can be rational from the perspective of the institution or participant responsible for it.

Public procurement supports reliable food supplies. Subsidised electricity protects farm incomes and makes irrigation affordable. Irrigation infrastructure increases agricultural production. Farmers respond to available markets, prices and the reliability of water access.

However, these policies can produce an undesirable combined outcome when the economic incentives supporting agricultural production are not sufficiently aligned with the hydrological limits of the regions where that production takes place.

The consequence is a system that can remain productive in the short term while gradually consuming its own natural capital.

1.1 The scale of groundwater pressure

According to the 2024 national groundwater assessment:

Indicator Assessment
India’s annual groundwater recharge 446.90 billion m³
Annual extractable groundwater resource 406.19 billion m³
Annual groundwater extraction 245.64 billion m³
National extraction stage 60.47%
Punjab extraction stage 156.87%
Haryana extraction stage 135.96%

The national average conceals substantial regional differences.

The 2024 assessment classified 751 of 6,746 assessment units as over-exploited, with a further 206 classified as critical.

These classifications are based on administrative assessment units. They should not be confused with direct measurements of every aquifer or interpreted as evidence that the entire country faces the same level of water stress.

The appropriate unit of intervention is therefore not necessarily the state or district alone. It is the aquifer and the water system connected to it.

1.2 Groundwater as accumulated natural capital

Historical research provides an important perspective.

MacAllister and colleagues analysed groundwater observations from 1900 to 2010 across north-western India and central Pakistan. Their study estimated substantial groundwater accumulation during the twentieth century, followed by approximately 70 km³ of groundwater loss during 2000–2010 in the analysed region.

The findings indicate that infrastructure and irrigation can contribute to groundwater accumulation under particular conditions, while sustained extraction can subsequently reverse those gains.

They do not establish a single date when all of India crossed a sustainability threshold.

The policy implication is more precise: affected aquifers must be assessed individually, including their historical water balance, recharge, extraction, surface-water interactions and local conditions.

2. Why the Existing Incentive Structure Is Difficult to Change

The problem is not attributable to one policy instrument.

Several mechanisms reinforce one another.

2.1 Food procurement and agricultural production

Minimum support prices and public procurement are important elements of India’s food-security architecture.

Punjab and Haryana have historically played a major role in supplying rice and wheat to the Central Pool. In KMS 2024–25, government estimates placed their combined paddy procurement at approximately 40% of Central Pool procurement.

These arrangements support predictable food supplies and provide an important degree of income security to farmers.

However, procurement incentives can also influence crop selection and production geography.

A 2024 study by Chatterjee, Lamba and Zaveri in Nature Communications examined the relationship between procurement incentives, rice-area expansion and groundwater depletion in Punjab.

This research provides evidence that procurement arrangements matter. It does not establish that MSP alone caused groundwater depletion.

The distinction is important: food procurement is not simply an agricultural price instrument. It is also part of national food-security infrastructure.

Reforming water use should not mean dismantling that infrastructure.

2.2 Electricity subsidies and pumping

Subsidised agricultural electricity reduces the marginal private cost of pumping groundwater.

This supports agricultural production and farm incomes, but it can also weaken the economic incentive to limit extraction.

Simply increasing electricity prices would transfer the cost of a system-level problem to farmers. It could also undermine political support for reform.

A more viable approach is to preserve basic farmer support while changing the incentives associated with additional pumping, equipment investment and water-saving practices.

2.3 Infrastructure and incomplete water accounting

Canal networks, surface-water distribution and groundwater extraction cannot be assessed independently.

Canal seepage may contribute to aquifer recharge in some locations. Consequently, lining every canal is not automatically beneficial.

Similarly, expanding irrigation infrastructure does not necessarily reduce groundwater extraction. Additional surface water must reach the farms and seasons where groundwater is currently being pumped.

The relevant measure is not simply the volume of infrastructure constructed or water delivered.

It is the net effect on groundwater abstraction and the wider water balance.

2.4 The institutional coordination problem

India already operates a substantial portfolio of relevant programmes:

  • groundwater assessment and monitoring;
  • irrigation investment;
  • micro-irrigation support;
  • river-linking studies;
  • renewable-energy pump programmes;
  • wastewater treatment;
  • watershed and recharge initiatives;
  • public procurement and food-distribution systems.

The challenge is to connect these instruments to common aquifer-level objectives.

A programme can succeed according to its own administrative indicators while producing limited improvement in the wider water system.

For example, irrigation efficiency can improve at the field level while total groundwater abstraction remains unchanged if farmers expand irrigated areas or increase cropping intensity.

Likewise, wastewater reuse may reduce freshwater demand in one location but transfer scarcity downstream if existing return flows are diverted.

This is why individual programme performance and system-level outcomes must be evaluated separately.

3. The Proposed Integrated Programme

The proposed programme is built around a simple principle:

Restore the water system that supports agriculture before making changes to the structure of agricultural production.

The programme combines six mutually reinforcing areas.

3.1 Water-supply substitution and inter-basin transfers

The first priority is to reduce dependence on groundwater by improving access to dependable alternative water sources.

This requires examining both direct and indirect substitution.

Direct substitution occurs when surface water replaces groundwater pumping for agricultural use.

Indirect substitution occurs when transferred or otherwise additional surface water supplies urban or industrial users, potentially freeing existing local surface-water resources for agriculture.

China’s South-to-North Water Diversion provides a relevant comparative case. Research published in 2025 reported groundwater recovery in parts of the North China Plain associated with a combination of surface-water diversion, pumping controls and favourable climatic conditions.

The recovery should not be attributed to water transfers alone.

For India, any proposed transfer must undergo independent assessment of:

  • donor-basin availability, including dry-year conditions;
  • environmental flows and downstream rights;
  • seasonal water requirements;
  • energy and conveyance costs;
  • water quality;
  • inter-state consent;
  • potential effects on donor and recipient ecosystems.

India’s existing National Perspective Plan for interlinking rivers provides a planning foundation. It does not, by itself, establish the feasibility of a particular transfer to Punjab or Haryana.

3.2 Crop-appropriate irrigation technology

The second priority is to improve irrigation practices without assuming that one technology is suitable for every crop.

Potential measures include:

  • alternate wetting and drying (AWD);
  • direct-seeded rice (DSR), where agronomically appropriate;
  • drip and sprinkler irrigation for suitable crops;
  • laser land levelling;
  • soil-moisture and weather-based irrigation scheduling;
  • improved field channels;
  • efficient pumps;
  • agricultural extension and technical support.

India already supports drip and sprinkler irrigation through the Per Drop More Crop programme.

The proposed approach builds on this foundation by treating technology adoption as a complete operational intervention rather than an equipment-distribution exercise.

Equipment, agronomic advice, maintenance, training and transition-risk protection must be considered together.

A reduction in water applied per hectare is not sufficient evidence of aquifer recovery. The pilot must establish whether total groundwater abstraction actually declines.

3.3 Treated-wastewater reuse

Urban and industrial wastewater can provide an additional source of water for agriculture where treatment quality, seasonal availability and distribution costs make reuse viable.

Israel provides a useful comparative example of large-scale wastewater reuse.

However, its experience cannot simply be transferred to India. Local conditions differ in sewer coverage, treatment capacity, water quality, agricultural geography and distribution infrastructure.

Each proposed reuse scheme should establish:

  • available treated volumes;
  • treatment and quality requirements;
  • seasonal reliability;
  • storage and conveyance costs;
  • existing downstream uses;
  • environmental-flow requirements;
  • the actual volume of freshwater abstraction displaced.

Treated wastewater must be measured as a source substitution, not counted as newly created water.

3.4 Aquifer-level governance

Groundwater systems do not necessarily follow administrative boundaries.

A state-only model cannot manage every aquifer effectively. A purely centralised model may lack local knowledge and legitimacy.

The proposed framework therefore combines national and state responsibilities with local participation.

Aquifer and basin councils could include:

  • state agencies;
  • local government;
  • farmer organisations;
  • smallholders and tenants;
  • downstream users;
  • local communities;
  • independent technical experts.

Their responsibilities would include local water budgets, seasonal allocation recommendations, monitoring, disclosure and grievance mechanisms.

The Australian Murray–Darling Basin provides a reference for using sustainable diversion limits at catchment and groundwater-resource-unit levels.

The institutional design must be adapted to India’s federal structure, agricultural systems and local hydrology. Financial and technical responsibilities should remain with the relevant public authorities rather than being transferred to farmers.

3.5 Groundwater recharge and restoration

Recharge structures, restored ponds, floodplain reconnection and managed aquifer recharge can contribute to groundwater recovery where local hydrogeological conditions support them.

The objective should be additional, verified recharge to the relevant aquifer.

Construction counts are not a reliable measure of success.

Projects must account for water quality, contamination, saline intrusion, maintenance and the possibility that a structure produces little additional recharge.

3.6 Aligning incentives while protecting farmers

The programme should retain basic farmer support and public procurement safeguards during the transition.

Incremental public expenditure can increasingly support:

  • efficient pumps;
  • surface-water connections;
  • irrigation technology;
  • agricultural extension;
  • monitoring and water accounting;
  • solar-energy arrangements with pumping safeguards;
  • payments linked to verified water-saving outcomes.

The basic electricity-support architecture should not be abruptly withdrawn.

Likewise, participation in water-saving programmes should not automatically affect MSP access or procurement eligibility.

The objective is to change the marginal incentives associated with water use without making farmers bear the full cost of restoring a resource that supports national food security.

4. The Economic Logic: Pay for Outcomes, Not Activity

A central weakness of many infrastructure and technology programmes is that administrative outputs can be mistaken for public outcomes.

Hectares covered, equipment distributed, treatment capacity installed and recharge structures constructed are useful operational indicators.

They do not establish that groundwater depletion has been reduced.

The proposed programme therefore uses a different standard.

Public support should be linked to a combination of:

  • Adoption of an agronomically validated practice.
  • Measured or independently estimated reduction in groundwater abstraction.
  • No unacceptable loss of crop yield or farmer income.
  • No expansion of irrigated activity that offsets the water saving.

A common cost-effectiveness metric should be:

Public cost per cubic metre of verified net groundwater abstraction avoided or replenished.

Avoided abstraction and additional replenishment must remain separate physical results, even if they are compared within a common evaluation framework.

The programme must also account for rebound effects.

If more efficient irrigation makes water cheaper to use and farmers consequently expand irrigated areas, the expected saving may disappear.

Similarly, the effects of several interventions cannot simply be added together. Improvements in irrigation, canal distribution and pumping efficiency may overlap.

Only the net change in the aquifer water balance should determine whether the programme has succeeded.

5. Political Conditions for Implementation

The programme’s political viability depends on how its objectives and safeguards are designed.

The first phase should be presented as an investment in agricultural resilience and national food security, not as a campaign to reduce rice or wheat cultivation.

Several conditions are essential.

Farmer participation

Farmer organisations should participate before programme design is finalised.

Initial participation should be voluntary, with transparent compensation rules and accessible grievance procedures.

The programme must also distinguish between different groups: large landowners, smallholders, tenants, agricultural labourers and communities without reliable drinking-water access may experience the same intervention very differently.

Procurement safeguards

The programme should include an explicit commitment that participation in water-saving measures will not automatically result in the loss of MSP access or procurement eligibility.

Alternative-crop procurement should be expanded only where demand, processing, storage and distribution arrangements have been demonstrated.

Centre–state cooperation

The Union government and state governments need agreed responsibilities for financing, infrastructure, data, water allocation and procurement.

Punjab and Haryana must have meaningful roles in decisions affecting their agricultural systems and water resources.

Independent verification

Baseline data, methods, annual results and uncertainty ranges should be published.

Independent scientific assessment is particularly important when determining whether the conditions for more restrictive measures have been met.

Early benefits

Aquifer recovery may take years.

To sustain participation, the programme should also deliver visible near-term benefits: more reliable water deliveries, reduced equipment-maintenance costs, agronomic support and protection against transition losses.

6. Crop Diversification as a Last Resort

Crop-pattern change is one of the most politically sensitive elements of agricultural water reform.

A premature shift away from rice or wheat could reduce farm incomes, weaken procurement arrangements and create new supply-chain problems.

At the same time, refusing to consider crop adjustment under any circumstances would leave policymakers without a response if other measures fail to restore a sustainable water balance.

The proposed solution is to agree on a last-resort procedure in advance.

It should activate only when independently verified evidence establishes that:

  • a specific aquifer or assessment unit has a persistent negative groundwater balance;
  • groundwater-level and storage trends corroborate the assessment;
  • feasible water-substitution, recharge, irrigation and governance measures have been implemented and evaluated;
  • a material residual deficit remains;
  • a targeted crop adjustment would produce meaningful net groundwater savings;
  • food-security requirements can be protected;
  • guaranteed markets and funded compensation are available.

The first response should be voluntary crop-switching contracts, guaranteed procurement and processing for approved alternatives, and compensation for verified income gaps.

More restrictive measures should be considered only if voluntary and supply-side interventions demonstrably fail and the necessary legal safeguards are met.

There should be:

  • no national or blanket prohibition on rice or wheat;
  • no activation based on one year’s rainfall or a single water-level reading;
  • no automatic reduction in MSP or public procurement;
  • no crop shift without verified water savings, market access and income protection;
  • a food-security override if domestic supply or strategic stocks fall below agreed safety thresholds.

The central principle is to negotiate the evidence standard and safeguards before a crisis forces the decision.

The trigger should remove the need to reopen the political argument over whether action is required. It should not remove scrutiny over where, how much and at whose cost adjustment occurs.

7. Pilot Programme: Punjab and Haryana

The proposed first implementation stage is a three-to-five-year pilot in selected over-exploited assessment units in Punjab and Haryana.

The pilot should select locations according to:

  • aquifer condition;
  • canal command and surface-water availability;
  • crop patterns;
  • pumping intensity;
  • social vulnerability;
  • data readiness.

Matched comparison areas should be included to distinguish programme effects from rainfall and other external changes.

The pilot should test the combined programme rather than isolated technologies.

Workstreams

Area Main activities Intended result
Water accounting Aquifer boundaries, observation wells, pumping estimates, canal deliveries and water-quality monitoring Auditable groundwater balance
Surface-water substitution Canal distribution improvements and assessment of transfer opportunities Measured groundwater pumping displaced
Wastewater reuse Treatment, storage, conveyance and downstream-impact assessment Safe and reliable freshwater substitution
Farm technology AWD, DSR, drip, sprinkler, levelling and irrigation scheduling where suitable Verified water, yield and income effects
Energy incentives Efficient pumps, solar export models and pumping safeguards Lower energy use without increased extraction
Local governance Aquifer councils, water-user participation and public reporting Legitimate local water plans
Farmer protection Procurement safeguards, compensation and equipment leasing Stable farm incomes and continued procurement access

Evaluation

The pilot should evaluate five dimensions.

  • Hydrology: net annual groundwater balance, water-level trends, extraction by source, recharge and uncertainty.
  • Agricultural production: rice and wheat area, yields, total output, cropping intensity and seasonal reliability.
  • Farmer economics: net income by farm size and tenure, input costs, compensation, adoption and dropout rates.
  • Public finance: capital and operating expenditure, subsidy costs, maintenance liabilities and cost per cubic metre of verified net pumping reduction.
  • Food security and equity: procurement volumes, Central Pool contribution, buffer stocks, drinking-water access, downstream allocations and effects on smallholders, tenants and agricultural workers.

Only interventions that demonstrate verified net groundwater savings, acceptable production and income outcomes, affordability and environmental compliance should be scaled.

A technology should not be expanded simply because it reduces water applied per hectare.

A transfer project should not proceed without independent assessment of both donor- and recipient-basin impacts.

8. Governance and Implementation

A National Food and Water Security Compact could coordinate the programme.

It need not begin as a new constitutional institution. An initial arrangement could operate as an intergovernmental agreement supported by a joint programme office, state implementation units, aquifer councils and independent evaluation.

Responsibilities would be distributed across four levels:

  • Union government: national food-security commitments, co-financing, inter-basin planning, common data standards and evaluation.
  • State governments: infrastructure, agricultural extension, local implementation and electricity-subsidy administration.
  • Aquifer and basin councils: local water budgets, participation, monitoring and allocation recommendations.
  • Independent scientific panel: validation of baselines, water-saving estimates, trigger conditions and annual results.

Indicative implementation sequence

Period Main actions
0–6 months Establish the joint design group, select pilot aquifers, agree data standards and farmer safeguards, commission baseline studies
6–18 months Upgrade monitoring, begin demonstrations, assess canal and wastewater opportunities, complete environmental screening
Years 2–3 Implement infrastructure packages, run multiple crop seasons, provide transition compensation and publish independent results
Years 3–5 Evaluate hydrological, agricultural and economic outcomes; scale successful measures; apply last-resort procedures only if trigger conditions are met
After year 5 Extend successful interventions to additional stressed aquifers and update the national framework

A final investment estimate cannot responsibly be derived from national averages.

It requires project-level assessment of transfer infrastructure, canal distribution, treatment and reuse pipelines, recharge, monitoring, equipment, extension, compensation and maintenance.

9. What India Already Has — and What the Proposal Adds

One of the important findings of the research was that India already has many of the instruments required to address groundwater depletion.

The country has groundwater assessment institutions, irrigation programmes, micro-irrigation support, river-linking plans, wastewater-treatment initiatives, solar-pump programmes, watershed projects and an established public procurement system.

The proposal does not seek to replace these initiatives.

Its purpose is to provide an additional framework through which existing capabilities and further measures can work towards a common outcome.

The distinction is important.

The central contribution is not the introduction of each individual technology or policy instrument. It is the connection between them.

The proposed architecture:

  • links water substitution to actual groundwater pumping displaced;
  • connects irrigation technology to aquifer-level outcomes;
  • links public expenditure to independently verified results;
  • protects farmers against transition risks;
  • preserves food-security and procurement safeguards;
  • establishes a sequence for implementation and policy adjustment;
  • defines conditions for a last-resort intervention before those conditions arise.

This shifts the standard of success.

Instead of measuring whether individual programmes have delivered their administrative outputs, the framework asks whether their combined effect has improved the water balance while maintaining agricultural production and farmer welfare.

The practical opportunity is to make existing and additional measures work together rather than treating them as separate policy initiatives.

10. Evidence Limits and Further Research

The proposal is an analytical framework, not a final engineering design or a costed investment plan.

Several questions require further work before implementation.

  • Aquifer-specific historical data. The dates at which individual aquifers crossed sustainable limits need to be established using consistent historical pumping, recharge and water-level data.
  • Inter-basin transfer feasibility. Donor-basin availability, dry-year reliability, ecological effects, energy costs and inter-state arrangements require detailed assessment.
  • Wastewater reuse. City-level treated volumes, quality, seasonal availability, downstream uses and distribution costs must be established.
  • Technology performance. Multi-season evaluation is required to determine the net effects of irrigation technologies on groundwater abstraction, crop yields and farmer incomes.
  • Crop adjustment. Potential water savings, market absorption, procurement costs, food-security effects and compensation requirements must be calculated for individual aquifers and agricultural systems.

These uncertainties should be published rather than concealed.

Groundwater assessment ratios, water-level trends and total aquifer storage are different measurements. Correlations between population, crop area and groundwater extraction do not independently establish causation.

A properly designed pilot should help close these evidence gaps.

Conclusion

India’s food-security system has delivered enormous benefits.

The objective of groundwater reform should not be to reverse those gains, reduce domestic staple production by default or transfer the cost of water restoration to farmers.

It should be to protect the natural capital that makes continued domestic food production possible.

The proposed programme approaches this challenge as a connected economic, institutional and hydrological system.

Its success depends on preserving farmer guarantees while improving water supply, modernising irrigation, strengthening local governance, aligning incentives and measuring actual groundwater outcomes.

The immediate recommendation is to establish a jointly governed Punjab–Haryana pilot and begin developing a national Food and Water Security Compact.

The strategic objective is straightforward:

Preserve India’s ability to feed its population independently for generations by restoring the water systems on which domestic agriculture depends.
A whole publication is available by link.

Selected Sources

  1. Central Ground Water Board. National Compilation on Dynamic Ground Water Resources of India, 2024.
  2. Central Ground Water Board. Ground Water Resources of Punjab – 2024.
  3. Central Ground Water Board. Dynamic Ground Water Resources of Haryana, 2024 Assessment.
  4. MacAllister, D. J. et al. (2022). “A century of groundwater accumulation in Pakistan and northwest India.” Nature Geoscience, 15, 390–396.
  5. World Bank. World Development Indicators: Population, total — India.
  6. Reserve Bank of India. Database on Indian Economy / Handbook of Statistics on Indian States.
  7. Government of India, Press Information Bureau. “Paddy Procurement in full swing in the Food bowl of India,” 30 October 2024.
  8. Chatterjee, S., Lamba, S. & Zaveri, E. (2024). Research on procurement incentives, rice-area expansion and groundwater depletion in India. Nature Communications.
  9. PRS Legislative Research. Punjab Budget Analysis 2026–27.
  10. UK House of Commons Library. “Farmers’ protests in India and agricultural reforms,” 13 December 2021.
  11. Nature Communications (2025). “Unprecedented large-scale aquifer recovery through human intervention.”
  12. Government of India, Press Information Bureau. “Drip and sprinkler irrigation through PMKSY,” 18 March 2025.
  13. Australian Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water. Sustainable Diversion Limits.
  14. OECD. Environment at a Glance: Israel Country Note (2026).
  15. Government of India, Press Information Bureau. “Interlinking of Rivers and Major Irrigation Projects,” 5 February 2026.
  16. Government of India, Ministry of Finance. Economic Survey 2024–25.

About the Author

Dmitry Kazakov is an independent Software & Systems Engineer. He has worked in software development since 2006, in paid professional IT roles since 2010, and has maintained an independent engineering practice since 2015.

His work spans systems architecture, industrial software, data analytics, knowledge-management systems and security engineering. His approach combines systems engineering with economic and institutional analysis, with particular attention to interacting constraints, incentives, dependencies and implementation conditions.

This publication is an independent analytical proposal. It does not represent the official position of the Government of India, NITI Aayog, any State Government or any cited institution.

Prepared with analytical assistance from ChatGPT and Grok.